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CUSLI EXPERTS’ ROUNDTABLE REPORT ON
“CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS –
LOOKING FORWARD”
Gabriella Marki & Jenna Russo†
ABSTRACT: On November 14, 2018, the Canada-United States Law Institute (CUSLI) hosted
an expert panel discussion on the subject of “Canada-United States Relations – Looking
Forward” at the offices of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC in Washington, D.C.. The purpose of the
meeting was to discuss the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that is
projected to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The panelists
examined the negotiations leading up to USMCA and evaluated its similarities and differences
vis-à-vis NAFTA.1
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
created a free trade zone between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. NAFTA
reduced import tariffs for many eligible manufactured goods in conjunction with
reductions accorded to other countries when the United States entered the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. At the time of its conclusion, NAFTA applied
to more than $1.2 trillion worth in trade between the three partner countries.
However, as time went on, the United States perceived that it was being treated
unfairly under NAFTA in certain respects and sought to create a new trade
agreement between the North American countries. Thus, negotiations for a
replacement to NAFTA began and eventually culminated in conclusion and

†

This report was prepared by Gabriella Marki and Jenna Russo. Ms. Marki and Ms. Russo
are Research Associates with the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) in
Washington, D.C.. PILPG is a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance to parties
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1 All information from this Meeting is up-to-date as of November, 2018.
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signature of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in
November 2018.
The panelists characterized the new agreement’s negotiations as a balance
involving strong national interests with a mutual commitment to modernize
NAFTA and rectify its shortcomings in an era of intensive globalization. While
the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered the negotiations with different
points of view, they all shared a commitment to modernize and improve the postNAFTA agreement and to ensure that the result benefited all parties involved.
Prior to this, leaders in all three countries held the common understanding that
NAFTA would not reopened due to its sensitive nature. Instead, modernization of
trading arrangements in North America would be pursued through negotiations for
a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which the United States withdrew from in 2017.
U.S. withdrawal from the TPP necessitated a return to a more limited trilateral
negotiation between the three countries in 2017-2018.
Canada approached the negotiations over a replacement to NAFTA with the
desire to maintain the benefits of the NAFTA, modernize it, increase efficiency
and ensure that the benefits of the new trade agreement would be felt and be widely
available to the broadest communities in the country. In particular, Canada entered
the negotiations assuming that NAFTA and North American competition were
crucial to Canadian competition on the world stage, with a desire to retain those
benefits while modernizing NAFTA as necessary. In Canada’s view, numerical
balances only constituted one of the several important indicators in assessing the
health of a trading relationship.2 Likewise, any changes to NAFTA should increase
predictability, stability, enforceability, and inclusivity.
While Canada maintained that the NAFTA represented its values well and was
generally beneficial, opinion in the United States was not the same. In contrast to
the Canadian perspective, the United States used trade balances as the
measurement of health and success of the trade relationship. The United States’
“America First” agenda notably made negotiations comparatively difficult from
the original trade agreements and previous NAFTA negotiations. The United
States viewed itself in a key moment of competitive disadvantage and concluded
that the then-rules-based system contained in the original NAFTA text did not
address lingering economic problems and inclusivity issues.
Accordingly, the United States sought to “rebalance” the agreement,
modernize the trade relationships, and “rollback” any features of instability. The
United States also sought to expand North American cooperation, trade, and
economic success. The United States participated in the re-negotiation of NAFTA
firmly believing that the same standards should exist for developed and developing
countries and that international bureaucracies should not coddle countries in a

Canada’s federal government noted that governments often evaluate the quality of a trade
agreement by percentages and amounts of tariffs cut, increased market access and the potential
to increase GDP generated by new relationships. However, in the case of NAFTA, these
measures were not applicable to the creation of the new agreement due to the fact that trade
between the United States, Canada and Mexico have been tariff-free for the past twenty-four
years.
2
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manner that prevented robust United States counteraction or endorses excessive
state involvement.
The overall goals of the re-negotiation that each country shared were to create
an agreement that stimulated job creation and higher wages, increase trade
accessibility to more participants, guarantee inclusivity, and generate a more
forward-thinking, modern approach to future trade success while at the same time
effectively representing national values.

II.

SIMILARITIES & DIFFERENCES

Though the USMCA is considered to update its predecessor, the new
agreement maintains NAFTA’s tariff-free trade in most goods. In addition, one
panelist characterized the USMCA as possessing ten key strengths absent in
NAFTA: (1) modernized chapters in new and emerging areas focused on
increasing North American competitive space; (2) reduced “red tape”; (3) updated
procedures on subjects such as electronic measures; (4) elimination of minute
differences in the three countries’ regulatory environments; (5) increased benefits
to enterprises; (6) heightened transparency and discussion of each countries’
regulatory environments; (7) updated automotive rules of origin with an increase
in Canadian competitive advantage; (8) increased agricultural market access for
Canada; (9) enforceable dispute settlement for labor and environmental matters;
and (10) increased accessibility for women, indigenous populations and other
minorities.
However, these similarities are coupled with key differences laid out in
specific provisions. In particular, the panelists conceded that while their initial
reactions to the USMCA were varied and leaned more towards moderate
achievement than grand success, a deeper analysis of the agreement revealed a
more important, nuanced set of differences. The panelists identified these
differences as being in the auto sector rules of origin provision, section 232
national security tariffs, non-market economy trade, and trilateral institutions.
Auto Sector Rules of Origin

Rules of origin determine what permitted percentage of imported inputs for
goods can be made within a region to ensure qualifications for a zero tariff. Adding
an increase of 12.5 percent from NAFTA’s automotive rule of origin, the USMCA
requires 75 percent of automotive content to be made in North America for
automobiles to receive duty-free treatment. In addition, 40 to 45 percent of the
automotive content must be made by North American workers who will earn at
least $16 per hour. As noted by the panel, this wage increase is likely to
correspondingly increase production within the United States and Canada.
Section 232 National Security Tariffs

The USMCA ensures the United States’ right to impose emergency tariffs of
up to 25 percent on automobiles and automotive content under national security
concerns. However, a side letter to the agreement protects Canada and Mexico
from these tariffs on cars that might be imposed by the United States. Compared
to the NAFTA, the national security provision in the USMCA broadens the scope
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of national security measures and does not contain the important qualifications
enshrined in previous agreements. The panel noted that this provision enshrines
Canadian acceptance that unilateral surcharges can be used under the guise of
national security interests. However, the agreement does not resolve United States’
surcharges on imports of steel and aluminum. While there have been some
movement to resolve these issues (i.e. the U.S. steel and aluminum surcharges),
they are not definitively resolved in the new agreement.
Non-Market Economy

The panel questioned the feasibility and applicability of the non-market
economy provision. Specifically, the panel noted the requirement in USMCA Art.
32.10(2) that “a Party shall inform the other Parties of its intention to commence
free trade agreement negotiations with a non-market country” with three monnths
notice. It also noted the companion provision in USMCA Art. 32.10(5) that if a
USMCA country agrees on a trade deal, the remaining countries are allowed to
terminate the USMCA with six months’ notice. The panelists remarked that this
was not necessarily an egregious provision. In their view it was somewhat benign,
yet cautioned about the future of North American competitiveness in this regard.
Trilateral Institutions

As noted by the panel, the USMCA enshrines an array of trilateral institutions
arguably more extensive than NAFTA, with a particularized focus on the trilateral
approach to North American economic cooperation than initially understood. In
particular, the USMCA includes a Free Trade Commission, identified in Article
30.1 that may create subsidiary bodies, compose trade facilitation committees, be
led by an Agreement coordinator, and includes a USMCA Secretariat. In addition,
the Agreement provides for trilateral committees on: rules of origin; trade in
goods; financial services; transportation; government procurement; North
American competitiveness; duty-evasion (anti-dumping provisions); duty evasion
and trans-shipment issues. While NAFTA included some of these committees, the
USMCA created more of them and endows them with more substantive functions.
Unique to the USMCA is Article 33.6, which establishes a macroeconomic
dispute settlement mechanism for exchange rates. One panelist noted that while
exchange rate issues between countries are rather infrequent, the mechanism is
nonetheless the “first of its kind.” The Macroeconomic Committee promotes
mutual cooperation, good faith, and trustworthiness and respect among the
countries. Hence, it belies the notion that the USMCA is just a moderate tweaking
of NAFTA or somehow a direct reflection of the current United States
administration’s trade agenda.

III. CONCLUSION
The CUSLI Experts’ Meeting touched on a number of important issues related
to the pending USMCA Agreement and its similarities and differences to NAFTA.
Panelists generally had a positive reaction to USMCA. One panelist characterized
USMCA as an “excellent trade agreement” for its greater inclusivity and potential
to increase the competitiveness of North America as a trading bloc. Another
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panelist applauded its greater enshrinement of trilateral institutions relative to
NAFTA. While the panelists also expressed some concerns about the USMCA,
they all agreed that different systems cannot exist without specific rules that bridge
differences between the countries, especially when they all aim to increase North
America’s economic competitiveness.

